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Abstract 
This study focused on the prototypical-exemplar 
categorization dichotomy in pre-school and school-aged 
children considering 4-11 years old children: categorization at 
4 to 5 years of age mainly relied on Perceptual /Descriptive 
features, and conceptual features were used appropriately 
only at 8 to 11 years.  
Keywords: childhood; concepts development; categorization; 
prototypicality-exemplarity.
Introduction 
Concepts lie at the very core of our thinking; they 
represent a way of mentally grouping and organizing 
objects, and create long-term memory contents thereby. 
They are hierarchically related to one other as to understand 
external reality the same object needs to be identified at 
different hierarchical levels (Hammer, Diesendruck, 
Weinshall, Hochstein, 2009). The process of categorization 
allows us to organize the world distinguishing between 
super-ordinate and subordinate classes (i.e., between 
wooden objects and wooden furniture). In turn, this process 
leads to comprehension of the relations that exist among 
various objects within a specific class (i.e., between wooden 
chairs and non-wooden chairs). Furthermore, categorization 
processes require the use of inferential mechanisms that 
allow knowledge related to a specific part of reality to be 
transferred to other elements of the same “kind” (i.e., to 
wooden chairs vs. my wooden chair). 
Although many studies have focused on analyzing the 
development of concepts in general, little investigation has 
focused on the pathways children follow to acquire 
concepts. The current debate on categorization processes is 
between authors who maintain that the basic (or exemplar) 
level, classic Rosch, Mervis, Gray., Johnson,& Boyes-
Braem (1976) position, is children’s earliest way of 
categorizing conceptual acquisition and argue that 
development of categorization proceeds at a different pace 
in different domains of knowledge (Mervis & Crisafi, 
1982); and other authors, such as Mandler (2008), who 
believe that a concept’s core structure is present early on in 
children. 
A relatively new line of thinking, however, proposes that 
category representations are unstable even within, and not 
only among, individuals of different ages, and that they 
depend greatly on the context in which they are applied 
(Barsalou, 1991). In contrast with their position, Sloutsky 
(2003) argued that categorization is grounded in perceptual 
and attentional mechanisms. He theorizes the existence of a 
concrete to an abstract shift as other recent studies do 
(Tallandini & Roia’s, 2005; Perraudin & Mounoud, 2009).  
The purpose of the present study was to examine 
children’s artifacts (church1 and bank) categorization at the 
two different levels of proto-typicality (a church or a bank) 
and exemplarity (the church/bank you know about)2
considering the existence of a developmental process that 
might account for the categorization of artifacts in 
prototypical and exemplar tasks. In particular, children 
would rely on different types of information 
(Perceptual/Descriptive, Conceptual, or Functional) to make 
categorizing decisions in function of their ages. The starting 
assumption was that prototypical concepts are identified by 
conceptual features, and exemplar concepts are identified by 
perceptual/ descriptive features (Keil, 1989). 
To the best of our knowledge, research using the same 
object considered at two different abstraction levels 
(exemplar and prototypical) has been conducted only with 
adults (Archambault, O’Donnell, & Schyns, 1999). 
Predictions 
The theories outlined above suggest three apparently 
contrasting accounts for the development of children’s 
categorization: one refers to the existence of a nearly inborn 
categorizing capacity (Mandler, 2008), the second to the 
importance of perceptual cues and to a radical change 
occurring during development (Sloutsky, 2003), the third 
points out to the relevance of the context (Barsalou, 1991). 
The predicted outcomes, in agreement with Sloutsky’s 
(2003) theoretical position, are based on the view that 
concepts are composed of different types of information 
(theoretical, perceptual, and functional), which are 
differently acquired and organized at different rates during 
development. Specifically, the previsions are that the 
youngest participants (4 to 5 year olds) would be unable to 
distinguish between the prototypical and the exemplar 
request; they would consider the aspect in which they were 
idiosyncratically most interested as being the most relevant 
for denoting the object under consideration, regardless of 
                                                          
1 A church is generally a very familiar building for Italian 
children--most probably because they typically attend church at a 
very young age, and many play- and social activities take place on 
church playgrounds and in parishes. 
2 We refrain from referring to the levels examined in our study 
as “basic” and “subordinate”, because the terms do not always 
have the same meaning in the object recognition- and object 
categorization literature (Schyns, 1998). 
148
November, 28th – P23
the hierarchical level of the request. The middle aged 
participants (6 to 7 year olds) will not show any particularly 
distinctive choice as they are no longer at an idiosyncratic 
level nor they have yet achieved the capacity of 
distinguishing the hierarchical level of the concept 
categorization. Conversely, the oldest participants (8 to 11 
year olds), would use a conceptual feature to categorize the 
prototypical building, and a descriptive/perceptual feature 
for the exemplar building, distinguishing the two levels of 
categorization thereby. Finally, considering Barsalou’s 
(1991) context relevance theory, as the concepts examined 
belong to the same domain, the expectation was that a 
highly familiar concept, such as “church”, would show 
differentiation in categorization at an earlier age than the 
less familiar concept of “bank” would, due to the greater 
amount of information that the concept “church” has 
available. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were non-referred, 4- to 11-year-old children 
divided into the following four age groups: 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 
and 10-11 years. All the groups presented nearly equal 
distributions in terms of gender. Participants refusing to 
perform the task were excluded from the research. 
Participants were from middle- and lower middle class and 
were recruited at public kindergardens and elementary 
schools. Three-hundred and seventy-six (376) participants 
were assigned the bank task, and 349 were administered the 
church task.  
Procedure
We verified the children’s degree of familiarity with the 
concepts of church and bank. In an effort to avoid the 
influence that is typically generated by pre-composed verbal 
descriptions or visual presentations (Deak & Bauer, 1996), a 
procedure that has participants produce their own stimuli by 
drawing them was developed.  
Hence, a task requiring the hierarchical identification of 
stimuli was developed that have the same content but which 
is related to two levels of categorization (prototypical and 
exemplar) for the same object to avoid confounding effects 
that might derive from using different stimuli for different 
conditions. The procedure therefore had the participants to 
draw an object and allowed the children themselves to 
specify the object’s key features, avoiding the influence of 
any adult intervention thereby. No similar procedure was 
found in literature.  
Children were randomly assigned to two groups and were 
asked, either to draw a bank (prototypical condition) / “draw 
the bank you know about” (exemplar condition), and “draw 
a church” (prototypical condition) / “the church you know 
about” (exemplar condition) on a blank A4 sheet of paper 
for each drawing. After they had drawn their pictures, the 
experimenter asked the focus questions, "How do you know 
that this is a bank/the bank you know about (or a church/the
church you know about?)" and then wrote down their verbal 
responses. To avoid the risk of contamination by further 
reasoning (Shallice & Warrington, 1975), only the first 
mentioned feature was considered. A classification system 
to group children’s answers was obtained in terms of 
Conceptual Features (CF), Functional Features (FF), and 
Perceptual / Descriptive Features (P/DF) . CFs, indicating 
the core of a concept, yield only one or two utterances per 
stimulus, as also theoretically substantiated by Keil (1989), 
conversely P/DF and FF were represented by numerous 
elements. 
Results 
Although the task had been administered following a 
Latin square distribution, the eventual order effect was first 
checked: an ANOVA for repeated measures was conducted, 
with task type and presentation order as IV and responses as 
DV. No effects related to presentation order emerged. 
Given that all measures were at the nominal level, a non-
parametric statistical approach was used. A two-way, log-
linear saturated model was computed for each stimulus 
(church/bank) and for each of the two conditions 
(prototypical/exemplar), with age and features as factors; 
the aim was to check for any systematic differences in the 
ways different-aged children mentioned properties. Then a 
three-way, log-linear saturated model, was applied with 
features, age, and stimuli (prototypical and exemplar) as 
factors to examine the influence, if any, of the two 
conditions (prototypical/exemplar). A second three-way log-
linear model was then computed to verify the familiarity 
effect, by using the two levels of familiarity (church/bank), 
type of features, and age group for each of the stimuli 
conditions (prototypical and exemplar). Lastly, log-linear 
parameter values and their standardizations were calculated 
for all statistically significant two- or three- dimensional 
effects. 
The church 
The prototypical church yielded a statistically significant 
two-dimensional effect (L2 = 14,71, df = 6, p < 0.05).The 
values of the log-linear parameters and their standardization 
indicated that within age group,  4- to 5-year-old children 
mentioned Perceptual/Descriptive features (PD) (z = 3.04;  
p < 0.001) significantly more frequently than the other 
features. A radical difference emerged for ages 8-9 and for 
age 10-11 yrs, in that PDF became the significantly least-
used feature (z = - 2.20 and z = -1.57, respectively). The 
two-dimensional effect was not statistically significant for 
the exemplar church (L2 = 5.30, df =6, n.s.). 
The bank 
For the prototypical task, the two-way, saturated model, 
log-linear analysis yielded a statistically significant two-
dimensional effect (L2 = 35,04, df = 6, p < 0.001).  
In the within age group analysis, 4 to 5 year olds used CF 
for the prototypical bank significantly less frequently (z = -
2.82; p < 0.005) than they mentioned PDF (z = 2.48; p < 
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0.01) or FF (z = 2.15; p < 0.01). At 8-9 years, an opposite 
trend was observed, with a statistically significant CF use (z 
= 3.54; p < 0.001) and a lower frequency in PDF use (z = -
2.41; p < 0.01). At 10-11 years, we once more observed an 
increased use of CF (z = 3.54; p < 0.001), and again a less 
frequent use of PDF (z = - 2.06, p< 0.01) and of FF (z = - 
2.01, p < 0.05).  
The two-ways log-linear analysis conducted on the 
exemplar bank responses yielded a statistically significant 
two-dimensional effect (L2 = 45,43, df= 6, p<.001). 
The within age group analyses showed  that 4- to 5-year-
old children used significantly more FF (z = 3.12; p < 
0.001) and significantly less CF (CF: z = -2.72; p < 0.005) 
than the older groups did, when asked to indicate the 
distinctive properties of the exemplar bank.  At the age of 8-
9 years, there was a lower frequency in PDF use (z = -3.80, 
p < 0.001) versus a higher frequency in CF use (z = 3.36, p
< 0.001). At the age of 10-11 years, children used with 
higher frequency CF (z = 3.26; p < 0.001) and lower 
frequency FF (z = -4.26; p < 0.001) . 
Discussion 
The questions the study aimed to answer were how and at 
what age children differentially identify the same concept at 
the two hierarchical levels of exemplarity and 
prototypicality. The predictions stemmed from the 
consideration that the capacity for expressing hierarchical 
categorization is gradually constructed during development 
(Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004), hence only older children would 
be able to identify the different taxonomic levels and a 
developmental shift should be observed produced by the 
conceptual change in older children (Sloutsky, 2003; Keil, 
1989). Moreover, a concomitant hypothesis, based on 
Barsalou (1991) theoretical position, would be supported by 
the influence of the degree of concepts familiarity 
(Barsalou, 1991). In general the results showed a clear 
difference between the responses obtained with the two 
stimuli (church and bank) first of all providing support to 
the hypothesis of the influence of familiarity in acquiring a 
hierarchical organization of categories (ib.). Moreover, only 
the older children identified the different taxonomic levels 
correctly, giving ground to the shift hypothesis in the 
acquisition of hierarchical categorization (Keil, 1989; Rosch 
et al., 1976; Sloutstky,2003). However, this finding was 
clearly supported by the data only for the more familiar 
stimulus, the church. In fact, more perceptual /descriptive 
features were mentioned for the exemplar church and more 
conceptual features were presented for the prototypical 
church in a shift from the 8-9 year level upward. A different 
pattern emerged for the bank, the less familiar stimulus, 
where there was indeed a different use of cues through ages 
but not a clear differentiation for the two stimuli. However, 
these data do not give support to the core category theory 
(Mandler 2008), as children at the first age level use almost 
at the same rate PDF, FF and CF. 
Overall, these data lend support to Sloutsky’s (2003), 
Tallandini & Roia’s (2005), and Perraudin & Mounoud ‘s 
(2009) positions. They argued that the perceptual aspects 
have a fundamental role in early categorization. Moreover, 
the existence of a concrete to an abstract shift has been 
confirmed.  
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